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ETHICS 
I 
Attorney-Client Confidentiality and 
Harm to Third Persons 
By Philip Halpern 
The Dilemma 
What should a criminal defense lawyer 
do upon learning as a result of a confiden-
tial communication with a cl ient that a third 
person may be in imminent danger of 
death? Suppose the client te lls the lawyer 
that hours before he stabbed a child whom 
he left in an isolated area. When asked by 
the lawyer about the extent of injury, the 
client responds, " I cut her, I'm not sure 
how badly." 
In this situation, the instinct of a non-
lawyer would be to pick up the phone and 
call the police to tell them that a critically 
injured person may be found at a particular 
location. Initially, a lawyer's instincts 
would probably be similar. However, hav-
ing reached for the phone, the lawyer might 
hesitate, saying to himself or herself: " I 
can 't disclose this infom1ation; disclosure 
would be contrary to professional ethics." 
What should the lawyer do? After ex-
amining the guidance offered by the perti-
nent provisions of the A.B.A.'s 1969 Code 
of Professional Responsibility and its 1983 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, I' ll 
suggest what I think is the appropriate 
response. 
Alternative Courses of Action 
l. Tell all without qualification. Prompt 
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disclosure of the information to the authori-
ties could save the life of an innocent child. 
The lawyer hesitates, despite the apparent 
urgency of the situation, because of a 
professional obligation to preserve the con-
fidentiality of information supplied by a 
client. The Code defines the lawyer's obli-
gation of confidentiality in Canon 4 which 
states: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the 
Confidences and Secrets of a Client." Con-
fidence is defined to include communi-
cation protected by the attorney-client 
testimonial privilege, while secret is de-
fined more broadly to include other infor-
mat ion obtained as a result of the 
professional relationship not covered by the 
privilege. 
DR 4-101 (B) requires that a lawyer must 
not " reveal a confidence or secret of his 
client ," nor may the lawyer ." use a confi-
dence or secret of his cl ient to the disadvan-
tage of the client." The information 
imparted to our hypothet ical lawyer seems 
to qualify clearly as a confidence protected 
by both the Code and the attorney-client 
testimonial privilege . There are, however, 
exceptions to the non-disclosure rule, two 
of which seem pertinent to the situation at 
hand . A lawyer '·may·· (note the permis-
sive usage) reveal confidences or secrets: 
lll when permitted by the Disciplinary 
·Rules or required by law or court order; and 
[2] when they relate to the intention of his 
client to commit a crime. 
With regard to the first exception, no 
obligation exists under the Disciplinary 
Rules or extrinsic law that requires disclo-
sure . There are a line of cases requiring 
defense attorneys to preserve and tum over 
to the authorities physical evidence adverse 
to their client, even if that evidence is 
obtained as a result of a confidential com-
munication. The duty to do so typically is 
founded upon criminal statutes prohibiting 
the concealment of evidence. However, no 
physical evidence is involved in the situa-
tion at hand and no general legal obligation 
exists to prevent harm to third parties. With 
regard to the exception permitting a lawyer 
to reveal the intent of a client to commit a 
crime, that does not appear applicable 
since the information relates to a past 
criminal act rather than the intent to com-
mit a future crime. 
The 1983 Model Rules similarly create 
an expansive zone of confidentiality. Model 
Rule 1.6 states that a lawyer "shall not 
reveal information relating to the represen-
tation of a client." Rule 1.6 (b) permits, but 
does not require, a lawyer to reveal confi-
dential information "to the extent the law-
yer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent the client from committing a 
criminal act that the lawyer believes is 
likely to result in imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm." However, as with the 
Code, breach of the confidentiality princi-
ple is permitted, not required, and only to 
prevent a future criminal act, not to miti-
gate the consequences of a past criminal 
act. 
Accordingly, the Code and the Model 
Rules seem to counsel against, perhaps 
prohibit, the lawyer's disclosing the loca-
tion of the child to the police as being 
contrary to the obligation to maintain confi-
dentiality of client information. 
2. Remain silent. Under one interpreta-
tion of professional ethics , a lawyer should 
sit back and do nothing, although he or she 
possesses information which might save the 
life of a child . I am not comfortable with 
that resolution . It is a simplistic and me-
chanical response to a complex moral and 
The duty of lawyers 
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of clients is most 
frequently defended 
on the ground of 
social utility. 
professional dilemma. 
The duty of lawyers to safeguard the 
secrets of clients is most frequently de-
fended on the ground of social utility. The 
guaranty of confidentiality is said to en-
courage persons in need of legal help to 
seek legal assistance that they might 
otherwise fa il to obtain. Additionally, it is 
claimed that the assurance of confidential-
ity is needed to promote full disclosure of 
all relevant facts essential to proper repre-
sentation. In sum, the argument is that 
society gains from an effective legal sys-
tem, for which attorney confidentiality is a 
prerequisite. 
There are two objections to this conse-
quentialist position. One is empirical. Evi-
dence is absent showing that effective legal 
representation would be imperiled if law-
22 
yers had an obligation to protect innocent 
third parties from serious harm, even if it 
meant divulging confidential information. 
Lawyers recite the principle of attorney-
client confidentiality so frequently that 
ritualistic incantation threatens to displace 
objective analysis. We come to believe that 
the principle is monolithic and inviolable, 
when it is not. For instance, under the Code 
and Model Rules, a lawyer is free to reveal 
confidential client information in order to 
defend against an adverse claim, to protect 
his or her reputation or to succeed in a fee 
dispute with a client. One wonders at the 
cost-benefit analysis that led to this result 
and who did the weighing. 
The other objection does not call into 
question the assumption that clients will 
consult with lawyers earlier and more fully 
if lawyers have no duty to act to protect 
innocent third persons. Even granting that 
assumption, to risk one person's life in 
order to help a client or benefit society by 
improving the legal system, according to 
this objection , reflects an erroneous 
weighing of conflicting values. 
I don't mean to suggest that the argu-
ments supporting attorney confidentiality 
are not strong, because they are. However, 
the principle of confidentiality and its 
underlying values should not be treated as 
absolute or uniformly superior to other 
values with which they may come into 
conflict. What is needed is an approach that 
acknowledges the conflicting values and 
seeks to accommodate them. In that spirit , 
let us consider other alternatives open to 
our hypothetical lawyer. 
3. Disclosure based on express consent 
of the client. Of course, if the client 
consents to the disclosure, there is not a 
problem under either the Code or the 
Model Rules. The moral dilemma is 
avoided. However, val id consent requires 
consultation with the client and full ex-
planation of the probable consequences of 
the client's waiver of confidentiality. The 
exigencies of the situation may not afford 
sufficient time for such consultation, and 
the cl ient may withhold consent after full 
discussion. 
4. Disclosure based on implied consent 
of the client. Model Rule 1.6 allows dis-
closure of confidential information that is 
"impliedly authorized in order to carry out 
the representation." Saving the victim's life 
could be in the client's interest by avoiding a 
charge of homicide. However, disclosure 
will not always be to the client's advantage 
and may seriously disadvantage the client. 
For instance, disclosure calculated to save 
the victim's life may not achieve its in-
tended effect (the victim may already be 
dead) and such disclosure may provide a 
vital evidentiary link between the client and 
the crime. From the client 's viewpoint , 
although a conviction for assault or at-
tempted homicide is better than one for 
homicide, no conviction is best of all. 
Hence, if the lawyer is to furnish confiden-
tial client information to the prosecutor or 
police, on the ground that the lawyer 
reasonably believes that divulgence is nec-
essary to prevent imminent danger to hu-
man life, it must be done in a manner 
reasonably designed to protect the client 's 
interests. 
5. Disclosure with an agreemem against 
anriburion. I suggest that the lawyer should 
advise the prosecuting authorities or the 
police that he or she possesses confidential 
infom1ation that may save the life of an 
innocent person, but that which the attor-
ney is free to disclose only upon agreement 
that such information will not be attributed 
to either the lawyer or the lawyer's client. If 
such agreement is obtained , disclosure will 
serve the public interest and perhaps the 
interests of the cl ient; at least hann to the 
cl ient will be minimized. 
Support for the Proposed 
Non-Attribution Rule 
An agreement forbidding attribution to 
the client or the client 's attorney of confi-
dential information where divulgence was 
reasonably believed necessary to prevent 
imminent and serious danger to human life 
finds support in cases requiring defense 
counsel to tum over to the prosecutor 
adverse physical evidence. For instance, in 
People v. Meredith, a California case, the 
court required a lawyer, whose investigator 
recovered the victim's partially burned wal-
let from a trash can based on information 
Prosecutors should 
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to the receipt and 
non-attribution of con-
fidential info171Ultion. 
supplied by the client, to turn the wallet 
over to the prosecutor. 
The cout1 also held that the wallet was 
admissible in evidence. More difficult was 
the admissibi lity of testimony concerning 
its location, since finding the wal let was the 
result of a client's confidential communi-
cation protected by the evidentiary priv i-
lege. In order to safeguard this privileged 
communication, the court suggested that in 
offering the physical evidence the defense 
lawyer had turned over to it , the prosecu-
tion should present it in a manner " which 
avoids revealing the content of attorney-
client communications o r the orig inal 
source of information . . . When it is not 
possible to elic it such testimony without 
identifying the Lsource j as the defendant 's 
attorney or investigator, the defendant may 
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be willing to enter a stipulation which will 
simply inform the jury as to the relevant 
location or condition of the evidence ... . 
[The] prosecution should not be permitted 
to reject the stipulation." 
The Role of Prosecutors 
Prosecutors should develop and publicize 
to the defense bar policies with respect to 
the receipt and non-attribution of confiden-
tial information where divulgence is rea-
sonably believed necessary to prevent 
imminent danger to human life. 
Additionally, if an attorney divulges con-
fidential information for the purpose of 
saving human life without an agreement of 
non-attribution , it would be shon-sighted 
and wrong for a prosecutor to attempt to use 
the communication against the accused. 
The predictable consequence of such action 
would be embarrassment of the particular 
defense attorney involved, and , more im-
portantly, deterring other members of the 
defense bar from coming forward with 
confidential information in similar c ircum-
stances. Additionally, the predictable chill-
ing effect on defense lawyers may not be 
offset by any evidentiary gain to the prose-
cutor, since such confidential inforn1ation 
may not be usable at trial even without an 
agreement of non-attribution. If the infor-
mation is protected by attorney-client privi-
lege, any disclosure of that information 
without a valid waiver of the privilege by 
the cl ient may well leave the privilege 
intact. 
Conclusion 
The arguments in support of attorney-
client confidentiality are strong , but they do 
not always justify silence when third per-
sons are threatened with serious and imnti-
nent harm. Creative solutions are needed to 
reconcile conflict between preserving 
cl ient secrets and preventing harm to 
others. • 
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